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Abstract
This thesis considers the tactical reconnaissance asset allocation problem in military
operations. Specifically this thesis presents methods to optimize, under uncertain
conditions, tactical reconnaissance asset allocation in order to maximize, within ac-
ceptable levels of asset risk exposure, the expected total information collection value.
We propose a deterministic integer optimization formulation and two robust mixed-
integer optimization extensions to address this problem. Robustness is applied to our
model using both polyhedral and ellipsoidal uncertainty sets resulting in tractable
mixed integer linear and second order cone problems. We show through experimen-
tation that robust optimization leads to overall improvements in solution quality
compared to non-robust and typical human generated plans. Additionally we show
that by using our robust models, military planners can ensure better solution fea-
sibility compared to non-robust planning methods even if they seriously misjudge
their knowledge of the enemy and the battlefield. We also compare the trade-offs of
using polyhedral and ellipsoidal uncertainty sets. In our tests our model using ellip-
soidal uncertainty sets provided better quality solutions at a cost of longer average
solution times to that of the polyhedral uncertainty set model. Lastly we outline a
special case of our models that allows us to improve solution time at the cost of some
solution quality.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this thesis we provide an analytic approach to increase the planning effectiveness
for tactical surveillance and reconnaissance. This chapter outlines our motivation for
this research and introduces our general approach.
1.1 Research Motivation
According to Army planners the United States military faces a future of persistent
conflict characterized by complex environments and an adaptive and creative enemy
[19]. This projection is based on the US counter-insurgency experience in Iraq and
Afghanistan as well as recent conflicts in places such as Lebanon, among others. As
US doctrine has evolved as a result of these conflicts, the importance of accurate and
timely intelligence, defined as analyzed information regarding the enemy, has become
clear. Intelligence drives operations, which results in new intelligence, which leads
to further operations. This intelligence/operations cycle is critical to the success of
any current or future military operation.
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Due to the importance of information and intelligence in military operations it
is vital for Army planners to use their limited Intelligence, Surveillance, and Recon-
naissance (ISR) collection assets wisely. ISR in this context refers to the Army’s
systems used to collect and process information needed by commanders and key
decision makers. Current doctrine emphasizes that the Army must focus its ISR
operations for maximum collection by a limited number of assets and resources to
produce the best intelligence possible [22]. Unfortunately, based on the author’s first
hand experience in Iraq, military planners are frequently overwhelmed with potential
reconnaissance and surveillance targets. Additionally, due to time constraints and
competing priorities planners are often unable to conduct a thorough analysis of how
to optimally assign collection assets to these targets. Instead planners either default
to an assignment plan that focuses all of their assets on collecting the information
that they value the highest or one that provides the longest coverage possible of the
most areas.
This thesis focuses on one component of ISR operations, tactical air-ground re-
connaissance, and provides an optimization approach to improve planning synchro-
nization and integration in this area. ISR synchronization ensures that the most
appropriate assets, both internal and external to the organization, collect infor-
mation. ISR integration ensures the efficient tasking of these assets to collect on
the information requirements that will return the most value [21]. We term this
problem the Tactical Reconnaissance Asset Allocation Problem (TRAAP). Tactical
air-ground reconnaissance is a mission, at the brigade level or below, to obtain infor-
mation useful to the commander using both aerial and ground collection assets. The
thesis addresses the TRAAP by developing a method to optimize, under uncertain
conditions, reconnaissance asset allocation in order to maximize, within acceptable
levels of asset risk exposure, the expected total information value collected. The in-
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corporation of uncertainty into the model allows planners to develop mathematically
robust solutions, i.e., solutions that remain optimal or near optimal, when executed,
under a range of conditions.
Specifically, this thesis presents deterministic and robust optimization formula-
tions to determine the optimal allocation of reconnaissance assets to targets. We
apply robust optimization methods to our deterministic formulations in order to de-
velop realistic, useful, and flexible asset allocation models. Robust optimization is
particularly useful in this case as it addresses a number of operational and computa-
tional considerations of the TRAAP. The tactical “fog of war,” defined by military
analyst Carl von Clausewitz as the uncertainty in situational awareness in military
operations, forces military planners to rely on inexact data. Robust optimization
allows planners to account for this uncertainty and balance, based on the preferences
of the commander, the feasibility and optimality of the solution within some known
probabilistic bounds. Even more important in the time constrained environment of
combat operations, the robust optimization techniques used in this thesis often gen-
erate computationally tractable problems that are able to be solved in a relatively
short period of time. The methods proposed in this thesis result in linear or second-
order cone mixed-integer optimization problems that are computationally tractable
using commercially available optimization solvers.
This research is broadly applicable to both military and civilian security scenarios.
In a military context our models can provide combat battalion and brigade planners
assistance in generating their reconnaissance plans. It can also assist planners in
identifying collection gaps in their reconnaissance operations. Similarly this method
can be used by civilian border security personnel, for example along the US/Mexico
border, to improve the effectiveness of their border interdiction efforts.
17
1.2 Thesis Organization
Chapter 2 provides background on the problem and a literature review. We intro-
duce relevant background on reconnaissance operations and ISR synchronization and
integration. Additionally we present an overview of robust optimization and asset
allocation problem literature. In Chapter 3 we introduce a deterministic formulation
of the TRAAP that incorporates reconnaissance asset risk considerations, multiple
asset types, missions, and mission configurations. The formulation successfully opti-
mizes the expected total information value collected of a given scenario. In Chapter 4
we present two robust extensions to the deterministic model. The robust extensions
successfully account for uncertainty in both asset risk exposure and target informa-
tion value. Each extension uses a different method to model uncertainty, allowing us
to compare the advantages and disadvantages of each method. Chapter 5 outlines a
useful special case of both the deterministic and robust formulations. This special
case provides drastic improvements in solution time at the cost of some solution qual-
ity. In Chapter 6 we compare the solution quality of our models using simulation.
Chapter 7 provides concluding remarks and areas of further research on this topic.
18
Chapter 2
Background
Famed American General George S. Patton once asserted that “You can never have
too much reconnaissance.” [16] He was referring to the tremendous advantage an
army has when it can effectively collect information on battlefield conditions and
the dispositions and activities of its adversaries. This chapter provides background
on military reconnaissance and surveillance operations and planning doctrine. We
also present background on optimization approaches previously applied to reconnais-
sance and surveillance operations and the robust optimization techniques used in this
thesis.
2.1 Reconnaissance and Surveillance Operations
The goal of this research is to assist planners in developing effective reconnaissance
and surveillance plans. Reconnaissance, as defined by the Army, “is a mission to
obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the ac-
tivities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the
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meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.”
[24] Surveillance operations are often executed as a part of reconnaissance opera-
tions. Both surveillance and reconnaissance involve observation and reporting. The
two are differentiated by the nature of how information is collected. Surveillance is
typically a passive observation of an area or areas and can be continuous. Recon-
naissance is generally a more active and short term collection of information and can
involve fighting for information [21]. In this thesis we do not attempt to dictate how
information is collected. Because surveillance is often a task completed as part of
reconnaissance, for the remainder of this thesis we will use the term reconnaissance
as an overarching description of both traditional reconnaissance and surveillance
missions.
2.1.1 Commander’s Inputs into the Reconnaissance Plan
Effective reconnaissance plans allow leaders to more efficiently apply their available
combat power, leading to fewer casualties and greater chance for mission success. To
illustrate this idea we present the following example.
Consider a light infantry battalion conducting security operations in Afghanistan
near the Pakistani border. The border creates a region in Pakistan for Taliban in-
surgents to organize, train, and equip themselves free from attacks from US and
coalition forces. Due to the length of the border, over 1500 miles (2430km) in total,
US forces have difficulty providing persistent and effective overwatch of all potential
crossing points. As a result many commanders are tempted, or pressured, into de-
voting too many of their resources towards denying the border to the enemy, at the
expense of other critical missions such as engaging with and building trust with the
local population, a proven counter-insurgency tactic. An efficient use of reconnais-
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sance assets in this case would allow the battalion commander to provide effective
border overwatch in the most critical areas, while keeping free the bulk of his forces
to execute more population-centric missions.
Effective reconnaissance plans are focused collection efforts. Commanders ensure
a focused collection effort by orienting their reconnaissance on a reconnaissance ob-
jective. The reconnaissance objective “is a terrain feature, geographic area, enemy
force, or specific civil considerations about which the commander wants to obtain
additional information.” [21] In our example the battalion commander’s reconnais-
sance objective could be the Taliban insurgents in Pakistan or possibly the border
crossing points he suspects the insurgents use most frequently. In either case by se-
lecting a reconnaissance objective the battalion’s planners and intelligence personnel
can begin to determine where and when to conduct reconnaissance. The comman-
der’s reconnaissance objective also allows planners to begin to set reconnaissance
priorities.
In addition to determining the reconnaissance objective the commander is respon-
sible for approving the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR).
The CCIR is a list of information requirements that facilitate the commander’s deci-
sion making. Within the CCIR is a list of Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR).
PIR ask a specific question that, if answered, provides intelligence to support a sin-
gle decision [21]. In our example scenario the commander may designate, “Does the
enemy infiltrate our area along Route Cubs?” as a PIR, where Route Cubs is a path
across the border from Pakistan. The CCIR and PIR allow planners to focus recon-
naissance assets on collecting information that will allow the commander to make
better decisions.
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2.1.2 Reconnaissance Planning and the Military Decision
Making Process
The commander’s reconnaissance objective, included in the commander’s guidance,
and CCIR/PIR are inputs into the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). The
MDMP is a seven step analytical process that assists commanders and their staffs in
reaching logical decisions [23]. The steps are, in order of execution, receipt of mission,
mission analysis, course of action development, course of action analysis, course of
action comparison, course of action approval, and orders production. Reconnaissance
generally takes place as soon as possible in this process and is executed continuously
throughout. An outline of the MDMP is shown in Figure 2-1.
Reconnaissance planning is based on the commander’s guidance and staff out-
puts of the mission analysis step of the MDMP. During mission analysis the staff
will conduct an intelligence analysis of the situation. Based on this analysis and the
CCIR, staff planners will develop an initial reconnaissance plan, also known as an
ISR or collection synchronization matrix. When developing a reconnaissance plan
military planners must allocate their available assets in such a manner that they
optimize the expected total information value of the plan. At the lowest level they
must assign each available reconnaissance asset to a set of missions. A mission is
defined as a time window and location where reconnaissance can be conducted. Mis-
sion locations are referred to as Named Areas of Interest (NAIs), that are generally
associated with one or more PIR. When considering mission assignments planners
must take into consideration, among other things, the amount of risk exposure each
asset will experience. For example, a commander may not wish to assign a highly
valued asset to a mission where enemy contact is likely. A commander’s tolerance
for risk will be reflected in his commander’s guidance. Once the plan is complete
22
Figure 2-1: The Military Decision Making Process
and approved by the commander a collection asset will then be officially tasked to
execute reconnaissance in one or more NAIs with the mission of answering the NAI’s
associated PIR.
In an extended security operation like our Afghanistan example the reconnais-
sance planning process can be a daily event. As battlefield conditions change the
commander’s PIR, reconnaissance objective, and risk tolerance will adjust accord-
ingly. Additionally, reconnaissance asset availability will differ on a daily basis based
on weather conditions, other operations, and numerous other variables that the bat-
talion cannot control. This requires the planning staff to continuously reassess their
reconnaissance plans and adapt it to the dynamic conditions of the battlefield.
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2.1.3 Types and Capabilities of Reconnaissance Assets
We now present a brief description of common reconnaissance assets used by the
United States Army and an overview of their capabilities and drawbacks. This is by
no means an exhaustive list but is meant to provide an example of the various types
of reconnaissance assets in use.
The majority of tactical reconnaissance operations are conducted by scout pla-
toons. Soldiers in scout platoons are specifically trained in the execution of recon-
naissance and surveillance operations. A typical light infantry battalion, such as the
one in our example, will have one scout platoon consisting of 19 soldiers divided
into three sections. A light infantry scout platoon is not equipped with vehicles,
although scout platoons in other types of combat units possess HMMWVs, Stryker
Reconnaissance Vehicles, and Bradley Reconnaissance Vehicles. Relying on ground
transportation limits the mobility of scout platoons, especially over difficult terrain.
The platoon is designed so that each scout section can independently conduct a sep-
arate reconnaissance mission, although this rarely happens in practice. Typically the
platoon works as a single unit to conduct reconnaissance on a single location. With
external support a scout platoon is capable of conducting continuous reconnaissance
for several days. However, scout platoons are generally employed to short duration
(less than 12 hours) reconnaissance missions and then given time to rest and refit
before their next mission. In addition to scout platoons, other types of ground units
such as infantry platoons and sniper teams also conduct reconnaissance.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are also typically employed in reconnaissance
operations, usually in a surveillance role. A light infantry battalion is generally
equipped with at least three RQ-11B Raven UAVs, see Figure 2-2. The Raven is a
hand-launched man-portable tactical UAV designed to conduct reconnaissance and
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surveillance. It operates at an altitude of approximately 500ft above ground level
at speeds of 28 to 60mph. It has a maximum operational radius of 6 miles with an
endurance limit of 1 to 1.5 hours. The Raven is equipped with IR thermal cameras
making it capable of operating at night [2].
Figure 2-2: Raven RQ-11B UAV
Combat battalions also have the capability to request the support of more capable
UAVs from higher headquarters. The most common of these UAVs is the RQ-
7 Shadow, see Figure 2-3. The Shadow uses a vehicle towed catapult system for
launch and a ground arresting system, similar to those used on an aircraft carrier,
for recovery. It has a wingspan of 14ft and can operate at altitudes as high as
15,000ft at speeds of 81 to 127mph. It has an operational radius of 68 miles with an
endurance limit of 6 to 9 hours. The Shadow is also equipped with IR cameras for
night operations [1].
UAVs are highly mobile, have a long flight endurance, and possess excellent op-
tics. These features make them excellent at providing persistent surveillance of a
small area or numerous small areas over time. However, UAVs do suffer from cer-
tain drawbacks making them not always the ideal reconnaissance asset for a mission.
Their primary drawback is their limited observation area. Some have referred to UAV
25
Figure 2-3: Shadow RQ-7 UAV
reconnaissance as conducting reconnaissance by looking through a straw. Their lim-
ited observation area make UAVs most useful for conducting reconnaissance in small
or well defined areas such as mountain passes or roads. Some UAVs, such as both
the Raven and Shadow, suffer from a large audio signature. Due to their relatively
low service ceilings and loud engines it is often easy to know if a UAV is operating
in the area. This characteristic can prevent the UAV from collecting information on
the enemy. UAVs are also limited by weather conditions. Poor weather can force a
UAV to land or diminish the quality of its optics to make them nearly useless. These
drawbacks make UAVs useful for only certain types of reconnaissance missions.
The last type of reconnaissance asset we will present are air reconnaissance assets.
Air assets include both fixed and rotary winged manned aircraft. Most Army combat
units do not have air assets organic to their organization and must request the support
of air assets from higher headquarters. Although fixed wing aircraft, such as F/A-
18s and F-16s, do occasionally provide reconnaissance support to Army units, the
majority of air asset reconnaissance is conducted by rotary wing aircraft. The OH-
58D Kiowa Warrior helicopter, see Figure 2-4, was specifically designed to conduct
battlefield reconnaissance. The OH-58D is a single engine, single rotor helicopter
with a crew of two. It has a maximum speed of 149mph, range of 345 miles, and a
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service ceiling of 15,000ft. A typical Kiowa mission will last no longer than two hours.
The OH-58D is also equipped with a Mast Mounted Sight (MMS) above the rotor
that provides thermal imaging, range finding, and target designating capability. The
Kiowa Warrior is armed with machine guns, rockets, and air to ground missiles [15].
Figure 2-4: OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Scout Helicopter
Rotary winged reconnaissance assets like the OH-58D are excellent at providing
short duration reconnaissance of large areas. Their optics allow them to observe
locations from a distance and from behind cover. Their armament also allows them
to fight for information if necessary. Unfortunately Kiowas are extremely vulnerable
to ground fire, adding a significant amount of risk to their employment. Air assets,
just like UAVs, are also subject to weather restrictions. Their relatively short flight
endurance also limits the utility of employing Kiowas in certain situations.
Reconnaissance planners must take the advantages and disadvantages of each
type of asset into consideration when formulating their reconnaissance plan. Based
on the weather, terrain, enemy situation, and a number of other variables, each NAI
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will have an appropriate asset type or group of asset types that will provide the best
reconnaissance in the area. For example, if we wish to conduct reconnaissance in
a high mountain pass that requires persistent observation for an extended period
of time, a Kiowa Warrior may not be the ideal asset to employ. The Kiowa’s lim-
ited endurance would leave critical gaps in observation. A UAV would be a better
choice as it can loiter in the area and focus on a small area due to the restricted
terrain. However, if poor weather is expected during the collection window a scout
platoon may be the best choice. A scout platoon is capable of conducting extended
observation of the area even in poor weather conditions.
2.2 Robust Optimization
In Section 2.1.2 we provided an overview of the process military planners use to de-
velop reconnaissance plans. The key problem military planners face when developing
a reconnaissance plan is how to best allocate their available assets in an uncertain en-
vironment so that they optimize the expected information value of their plan, within
certain physical and commander dictated constraints. This problem lends itself to
an optimization based approach.
The TRAAP falls into the category of optimization problems known as resource
allocation problems. More specifically, the TRAAP can be considered a general
knapsack problem. Knapsack problems consist of a set of items, each with a specified
value and weight, and a “knapsack” with a defined capacity. The goal is to place items
in the knapsack in such a manner as to maximize the total value of the items in the
knapsack without exceeding the weight capacity of the knapsack. Knapsack problems
have numerous applications and have been extensively studied. In the TRAAP our
“items” are mission assignments that have an associated expected information value
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and risk exposure. Our knapsack consists of the commander’s risk tolerance of our
assets.
Traditionally, optimization problems such as the knapsack problem assume we
have perfect knowledge of the problem parameters. In the case of the knapsack
problem we generally assume that we know with certainty the values, weights, and
capacity of the items and knapsack. In real world applications this assumption is
usually incorrect and can lead to highly unstable solutions. In fact, solutions “can
exhibit remarkable sensitivity to perturbations in the parameters of the problem,
thus often rendering a computed solution highly infeasible, suboptimal, or both (in
short, potentially worthless)” [7]. Robust optimization seeks to address this problem.
Robust optimization attempts to find solutions that remain optimal or near op-
timal under a range of conditions. It does this by modeling uncertainty in a de-
terministic, set-based manner. By using convex, closed sets to model uncertainty
robust optimization allows us to derive a solution that gives up some expected so-
lution value but will remain optimal for all data realizations within the uncertainty
set. This approach has numerous advantages. First, unlike stochastic optimization,
robust optimization has been shown to remain tractable for large problems. Second,
we can vary the trade off of robustness and optimality in our solution by chang-
ing the size or shape of the uncertainty set. Third, robust optimization requires no
prior knowledge of the nature or distribution of the data uncertainty. Fourth, robust
optimization allows us to derive probabilistic bounds on constraint violation.
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2.3 Literature Review
2.3.1 Robust Optimization Literature
The first robust model approach was proposed by Soyster in 1973 [18]. Soyster
proposed a linear optimization model that would remain feasible for all realizations of
data within a convex set. He showed that his approach was the equivalent of solving
the model after setting all unknown parameters to their worst case values. The
drawback of Soyster’s method is that it results in extremely conservative solutions.
Furthermore, Soyster’s method can only account for column-wise uncertainty.
In the late 1990’s Ben-Tal and Nemirovski [4, 5, 6] and El Ghaoui et al. [13]
independently addressed the problem of over-conservatism in Soyster’s method by
proposing the use of ellipsoidal uncertainty sets. Ellipsoidal uncertainty sets are
appealing for many reasons, the foremost being that they closely resemble typical
measurement errors. Using the Ben-Tal and Nemirovski/El Ghaoui et al. approach
one must derive and solve a robust counterpart of the linear optimization problem
that results in a solution that is robust and much less conservative than the solution
produced using Soyster’s method. However, tractability suffers using this approach
as the robust counterparts are non-linear conic quadratic problems.
In 2003 Bertsimas and Sim [9] proposed an approach that avoids both the over-
conservatism of Soyster’s method and the tractability concerns of the method’s pro-
posed by Ben-Tal and Nemirovski/El Ghaoui et al. The Bertsimas/Sim method
seeks to protect against a pre-specified number, Γ, of uncertain parameters assuming
their worst case values. They show that the method ensures constraint feasibility
if the number of uncertain coefficients assuming their worst case values is less than
Γ. Furthermore, they provide probabilistic guarantees that even if more than Γ
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coefficients change, the robust solution will be feasible with high probability. The
Bertsimas/Sim approach also maintains the tractability of the model. For example,
the robust counterparts of linear problems, remain linear. Therefore this approach
is suitable for applications involving a large number of variables and constraints. We
further discuss and apply the Bertsimas/Sim approach in Chapter 4.
2.3.2 Robust Reconnaissance Asset Allocation Literature
In 2004, Bertucceli et al. [10, 11] applied robust optimization using a modified Soys-
ter’s method to the UAV task assignment problem. In this approach attack UAVs
are assigned to targets with the goal of maximizing the total reward of targets that
are attacked. The reward for striking each target is subject to uncertainty. In their
model the uncertainty associated with each target can be reduced if a reconnaissance
UAV is assigned to the target prior to an attack UAV.
Bertucceli et al. apply robustness to their formulation by using a modified Soys-
ter’s method. The reward for attacking target i at time k, c¯ki, is uncertain with a
known standard deviation, σki. A scalar, µ, allows the planner to adjust the amount
of robustness in the solution from no protection against uncertainty to complete
protection against uncertainty. Complete protection against uncertainty in their for-
mulation is equivalent to Soyster’s method. This modified Soyster’s formulation is
outlined below
max
|NT |∑
i=1
c¯kixki − µσkixki + µσyki
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s.t.
|NT |∑
i=1
xki = |NV S|
|NT |∑
i=1
yki = |NV R|
xki, yki ∈ {0, 1}
Where |NT | is the number of targets, |NV S| is the number of strike UAVs, and |NV R|
is the number of reconnaissance UAVs. xki is 1 if a strike UAV is assigned to target
i at time k and zero otherwise. yki is 1 if a reconnaissance UAV is assigned to target
i at time k and zero otherwise.
In 2006, Bryant [12] and Sakamoto [17] applied the robust optimization framework
presented in Bertsimas and Sim [9] to address UAV task assignment and routing
problems. Bryant proposed a UAV assignment formulation based on the military’s
Effects Based Operations (EBO) framework. Tasks are valued based on their ability
to achieve desired effects. UAV assignments to tasks are then made to maximize
the total desired effects of the plan. Bryant then applied robustness to his planning
formulation using both the Bertsimas and Sim method with polyhedral uncertainty
sets and using chance constrained programming.
Sakamoto approached the UAV assignment problem as a vehicle routing problem.
In his formulation a UAV is presented with a set of tasks, with associated reward
values, located throughout a geographic area. His formulation seeks to select the
group of tasks and order of execution so as to maximize the total reward of the UAV
mission. He then applies robustness using the Bertsimas and Sim method using
polyhedral uncertainty sets.
This thesis seeks to build on this work. Whereas previous optimization ap-
proaches to reconnaissance asset allocation problems have focused exclusively on
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UAV task assignment, this thesis extends this approach to include UAV, air, and
ground reconnaissance assets. By doing so, this thesis also allows us to model the
benefits of mixing, using assets of different types to simultaneously collect informa-
tion on the same target, and redundancy, using more than one asset of the same
type to simultaneously collect information on a single target, which have been ne-
glected in previous work [24]. Lastly, this thesis uses more advanced methods to
model uncertainty, i.e., ellipsoidal and central-limit theorem based uncertainty sets,
than previous work on reconnaissance asset allocation problems. To the best of our
knowledge this is the first application of these specific modeling methods in a military
reconnaissance context.
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Chapter 3
Deterministic Approach
We first consider a deterministic optimization model approach to the TRAAP. Be-
fore we do this, we first describe the available data and key decisions facing tactical
reconnaissance planners. Our deterministic model successfully generates a reconnais-
sance plan that maximizes the expected information value returned of the plan. We
also present two algorithms that approximate a human planner’s approach to the
TRAAP. The plans generated by these algorithms will be used to help evaluate the
performance of our optimization models.
3.1 Data and Decisions
Reconnaissance planning is based on the commander’s guidance and staff outputs
of the mission analysis step of the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), see
Section 2.1.2 for further discussion of reconnaissance planning and the MDMP. This
information comprises the data used in our optimization model. In particular, re-
connaissance planners use the staff estimates for the number and type of available
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reconnaissance assets, the capabilities of each of these assets, the locations where
information needs to be collected, known as Named Areas of Interest (NAIs), the
collection time windows associated with each NAI, the collection priority for each
NAI, and the commander’s risk assessment to develop their plans.
Using this information military planners must allocate their available reconnais-
sance assets, generally in what is known as an ISR synchronization matrix or recon-
naissance plan, in such a manner that they optimize the expected total information
collection value of the plan. At the lowest level they must assign each available
reconnaissance asset to a set of missions. A mission is defined as a time window
and location, i.e., NAI, where reconnaissance can be conducted. These assignment
instructions constitute the reconnaissance plan.
When developing their reconnaissance plan, planners must also consider the im-
pact of mixing collection assets and of redundancy. Mixing is using two or more
different types of assets to simultaneously collect against a single NAI, while redun-
dancy is using more than one of the same type of asset to simultaneously collect on a
single NAI [24]. Typically using mixing or redundancy increases the collected infor-
mation value of a particular reconnaissance mission. Therefore, planners must decide
not only where and when each asset should be assigned, but also the configuration of
assets that are assigned to each NAI. A configuration is defined as a collection of one
or more assets, not necessarily of the same type, that are assigned simultaneously
to the same NAI. An example of a configuration could be one platoon and one Un-
manned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), while another example of a valid configuration could
be simply a single UAV.
Planners must also incorporate operational risk into their reconnaissance plans.
Risk, in this context, refers to hazards that exist on the battlefield, such as enemy
forces, weather conditions, or dangerous terrain, that can result in mission degrada-
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tion or mission failure [20]. Planners identify potential risk during mission analysis
and use this information when developing their plans. In practice, the commander
will identify what he feels is an acceptable level of risk exposure for his assets. Plan-
ners will then use the information they have regarding potential operational risk and
allocate assets in such a way as to not expose any asset to risk levels above the
prescribed limit.
Another consideration when forming a reconnaissance plan is the effect of unit
movements during collection time windows. Each NAI has an associated collection
window or windows. A collection window is a block of time when the planner believes
he has the greatest chance of gathering useful information in an NAI. Sometimes it
is useful for some or all of the assets that are conducting reconnaissance in an NAI
to be reassigned before the end of a collection window. A planner may consider this
action if, during a portion of the collection window, the expected information value
in a different NAI is significantly greater than the expected information value of the
original NAI. Mid-collection window asset transitions of this type allow a greater
utilization of available assets and increase the expected total information value of
the reconnaissance plan.
Although asset transitions typically generate plans with higher expected infor-
mation value, asset transitions also have associated penalties. Generally ground
reconnaissance units wish to minimize their total number of movements on the bat-
tlefield. A reconnaissance unit’s greatest asset is its ability to remain unobserved
by the enemy. When a ground unit is told to move from one location to another it
must expose itself, to some degree, to enemy observation. Often, once a reconnais-
sance unit is exposed, the enemy will adjust their activity in the area for a duration
of time in order to deny the friendly unit of the information it is trying to collect,
thus lowering the expected information value of further reconnaissance in this area.
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Therefore, in order to accurately model asset transitions our formulation must only
allow a transition when the expected increase in total information value more than
offsets the associated reduction in information value of further reconnaissance in the
original NAI. It is also important to note that not all asset types are subject to tran-
sition penalties. For example, many UAVs and manned reconnaissance aircraft fly
at altitudes where they do not increase their chances of enemy observation as they
move around the battlefield.
Although aerial reconnaissance platforms generally do not suffer from transition
penalties they are restricted by endurance limitations. UAVs and manned aircraft are
subject to mission duration limitations based on fuel capacity, weather conditions,
and other environmental factors. As a result, each system can only conduct recon-
naissance for a specified period of time before being forced to return to an airfield to
refuel and conduct maintenance. By incorporating asset endurance limitations into
our model we can generate more realistic plans and gain insight into the best times
to conduct resupply and maintenance for aerial assets.
3.2 Deterministic Model Formulation
With these considerations in mind we now model the TRAAP as an integer optimiza-
tion problem. Using the outputs of mission analysis we identify a set J of available
reconnaissance assets and I of NAIs where we wish to conduct reconnaissance. As-
sets are divided into K types, e.g., platoons, UAVs, sniper teams, etc., where the set
of assets of type k ∈ K, Ak, is a subset of J . All assets of the same type are assumed
to have equivalent capability. In order to account for mixing and redundancy each
mission can be serviced by multiple configurations of assets. As mentioned earlier,
an example of a configuration could be one platoon and one UAV. This configuration
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would be deemed feasible if at least one mission calls for at a minimum one platoon
and one UAV to conduct reconnaissance. The feasible configurations for all potential
missions are compiled into a set C. The quantity of asset type k ∈ K in configuration
c ∈ C is defined by the parameter akc.
We also have the sets Ti, defined as the set of time intervals when we wish to
conduct reconnaissance in NAI i, to reflect collection time windows. We then have
the set T , of which Ti ⊂ T , as the complete set of discrete time intervals in our
planning time horizon. Note that this formulation gives us the flexibility to schedule
multiple, non-consecutive collection windows in each NAI during our planning time
horizon. We then define the parameter eki1i2 as the number of time intervals required
for assets of type k to transition from NAI i1 to NAI i2.
The remaining model parameters are also developed from the mission analysis
outputs. The expected information value fic of executing reconnaissance in NAI
i in configuration c is based on a number of variables, including the commander’s
collection priorities, the number and capabilities of the reconnaissance assets in con-
figuration c, expected weather conditions, target characteristics, among others. The
anticipated risk rjic associated with asset j conducting reconnaissance in NAI i in
configuration c is, much like the information value, a function of multiple variables.
These variables include the enemy situation, the distance of the NAI from medical
facilities, the number and capabilities of nearby friendly units, etc. and can be de-
rived from the commander’s risk assessment. The risk assessment, along with the
commander’s intent, also provides the model with the acceptable level of accumu-
lated risk mj that each asset can be exposed to, we refer to this as an asset’s risk
budget. In our model we assume that both the information value, fic, and the risk
value, rjic, per time period remain constant in each NAI throughout the planning
time horizon. The extension to time varying parameters is straightforward.
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Next, we define the set B ⊂ K of asset types that are subject to asset transition
penalties. Asset transition penalties are defined by the constants α and β as follows.
If a combination (j, i, c) is engaged at time t−1 for some j, but not engaged at time t,
then for the next β time periods the value fi,c we obtain for conducting reconnaissance
at (i, c) is reduced to fi,c(1− α). That is, the expected information value is reduced
by α% during these periods. The values of the α and β parameters are adjustable
and based on the commander’s preferences and staff intelligence estimates from the
MDMP.
We then define the set L ⊂ K of asset types that have endurance limitations. For
each element k in L we have a new parameter, sk, that we define as the maximum
consecutive time periods assets of type k can conduct reconnaissance before needing
to refuel or conduct maintenance. In our model we assume that travel to and from,
and execution of refueling and maintenance activities can be conducted in one time
period. This assumption can easily be adjusted in our model to reflect different
operational conditions.
Our model has four types of binary decision variables. The first set of variables,
yict, represent whether reconnaissance is conducted in NAI i in configuration c during
time period t. The second type of decision variable, xjict, corresponds to whether
asset j conducts reconnaissance in NAI i in configuration c during time interval
t. We also define auxiliary binary decision variables, wit and pict to account for
asset transitions. The logic for wit is as follows. If xjic,t−1 = 1 and xjict = 0, then
wit = ... = wi,t+β−1 = 1. Moreover, if yict = 1 and wit = 1, then pict = 1, and in this
case the reward fic we receive will be fic(1− α) due to the asset transition penalty.
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Using this information we have the following formulation.
max
∑
i∈I,c∈C,t∈T
fic (yict − αpict)
s.t.
∑
c∈C
yict ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I,∀t ∈ Ti (3.1)
yict = 0 ∀i ∈ I,∀t /∈ Ti (3.2)
xjict ≤ yict ∀j ∈ J,∀i ∈ I,∀t ∈ T (3.3)∑
j∈Ak
xjict = akcyict ∀k ∈ K, ∀i ∈ I,∀c ∈ C, ∀t ∈ T (3.4)
1−
∑
c∈C
xji1ct ≥
∑
c∈C
xji2ct′ ∀j ∈ Ak,∀k ∈ K, ∀i1, i2 ∈ I : i1 6= i2, (3.5)
∀t ∈ T : t ≤ t′ ≤ t+ eki1i2∑
i∈I,c∈C,t∈Ti
rjicxjict ≤ mj ∀j ∈ J (3.6)
t∑
t′=t−sk
∑
i∈I,c∈C
xjict′ ≤ sk ∀j ∈ Ak,∀k ∈ L,∀t ∈ T : t > sk (3.7)
β
∑
c∈C
(xjict−1 − xjict) ≤
t+β−1∑
t′=t
wit′ ∀j ∈ Ak,∀k ∈ B, ∀i ∈ I,∀t ∈ T : t ≥ 2 (3.8)
yict + wit ≤ pict + 1 ∀i ∈ I,∀c ∈ C, ∀t ∈ T (3.9)
xjict, yict, wit, pict ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ J,∀i ∈ I,∀c ∈ C, ∀t ∈ T
Constraints (3.1) allow missions to be executed in only one feasible configuration.
Constraints (3.2) ensure that no assets can be allocated to NAIs during time intervals
that are not part of the set Ti, that is time intervals not in NAI i’s collection windows.
Constraints (3.3) ensure assets can only be assigned to missions and configurations
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that are executed. Constraints (3.4) ensure that the correct number of each asset type
are assigned to executed configurations and missions. Constraints (3.5) ensure that
assets are not assigned to a new NAI until after the appropriate number of transition
time intervals. Constraints (3.6) are risk constraints. They restrict assets from being
exposed to more risk than their maximum allowable risk level. Constraints (3.7)
enforce endurance limitations on aerial assets. Lastly, constraints (3.8) and (3.9)
determine when an asset transition penalty occurs.
3.3 Human Planning Approximation Algorithms
In order to gain a better understanding of the quality of our models we compare our
optimization based reconnaissance plans to estimates of reconnaissance plans devel-
oped by human planners. As discussed in Section 1.1, due to time constraints and
competing priorities military planners generally default to reconnaissance plans that
they feel will return the information that they value the highest or one that provides
coverage of the most areas. Thus, based on the authors first hand observations, hu-
man plans typically have all of their collection assets focused on the highest priority
areas or have their assets spread thin over the entire battlefield. In either case, hu-
man planners nearly always disregard the level of uncertainty associated with each
mission when developing their plans. With these observations in mind we present
two planning algorithms, one for each type of typical human reconnaissance plan,
for comparison with our models.
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3.3.1 The High Priority Mission Algorithm
We now consider the first type of planner, one who focuses his assets exclusively
on the highest priority missions. A high priority mission, in this context, is a mis-
sion with a high expected information value. Thus, a greedy algorithm, where mis-
sion/configuration assignments are made solely on their expected information value,
provides a reasonable approximation of how a human planner might act. In this al-
gorithm the planner prioritizes his collection efforts on the NAIs and configurations
that produce the highest expected information value. Beginning with the highest
priority NAI/configuration pair, the algorithm assigns assets in such a manner as
to maximize the total number of time periods that the NAI/configuration pair can
be executed without violating an asset’s risk budget. Once no more assets can be
assigned to an NAI/configuration pair the algorithm steps to the next highest pri-
ority NAI/configuration pair. The algorithm continues until no more assets can be
assigned to any NAI/configuration pairs without violating their risk budget.
The High Priority algorithm is outlined in detail in the steps below.
1. Create a list of all feasible NAI/configuration pairs.
2. IF list of feasible NAI/configuration pairs is empty, exit algorithm.
3. ELSE select NAI/configuration pair, (i, c), from list with highest expected
information value.
4. Create a list of feasible time periods, from the list of time periods that re-
connaissance can be conducted in NAI i, where assets are available to execute
configuration c.
5. Create a list of all possible asset groups that fulfill configuration c.
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6. FOR all groups in the asset group list:
(a) Create a list of asset group available time periods, from the list of feasible
time periods, that the asset group has all assets available. Record the
total number of time periods that the asset group is available, ta.
(b) Determine the number of time periods, tr, that the asset group can con-
duct reconnaissance in NAI i without any member of the group violating
its risk budget.
7. Assign all asset groups an asset group score. The asset group score equals the
minimum of ta and tr.
8. Determine the highest asset group score.
9. IF the highest asset group score is zero, skip to step 15.
10. IF multiple asset groups have the highest asset group score, select the asset
group, A, with the highest sum of remaining asset risk budgets.
11. ELSE select the asset group, A, with the highest asset group score.
12. Assign each asset in A to NAI i to the first tr time periods in the list of
asset group available time periods determined in step 6(a). Call this the set of
executed time periods.
13. Reduce the risk budget of each asset in A by the accumulated risk of this
assignment.
14. Mark all assets in A as unavailable during all executed time periods plus re-
spective transition times.
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15. Remove (i, c) from list of feasible NAI/configuration pairs and return to step
2.
3.3.2 The Maximum NAI Coverage Algorithm
Next, we present a planning algorithm to model the behavior of a planner that is
primarily concerned with conducting reconnaissance in many different NAIs. This
algorithm is also a greedy algorithm, in that asset assignments to NAIs are prioritized
by their expected information value, but this algorithm also attempts to avoid, as
much as possible, assigning more than one asset to an NAI. This algorithm considers
each asset separately, beginning with the asset that has the highest remaining risk
budget. It will then attempt to assign each asset in such a manner as to avoid NAIs
with assets already assigned to them during any portion of the NAI’s collection
windows. If this is not possible the algorithm will then attempt to assign the asset
to any NAI/time period with no other assets assigned. Only then will the algorithm
consider pairing the asset with a previously assigned asset. The algorithm stops once
all assets are unable to be assigned without violating their risk budgets.
The NAI Coverage algorithm is outlined in detail below.
1. IF all assets have been considered for assignment, select asset, j, with highest
remaining risk budget
2. ELSE select asset type, k, with highest expected information value for a single
asset configuration with at least one asset that has not been considered for
assignment.
(a) Select asset, j, of type k, that has not been considered for assignment
with the highest remaining risk budget.
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3. Create a list of NAIs that request an asset of the same type as asset j, and
have no assets currently assigned to them.
4. IF this unassigned NAI list is not empty, select NAI i with highest expected
information value for a configuration with only asset j.
(a) Calculate the number of time periods, t, asset j can be assigned to NAI i
without violating its risk budget and transition constraints.
(b) IF t > 0, assign asset j to NAI i for up to t time periods it is available or
all feasible time periods in NAI i, whichever is smaller.
i. Reduce asset js risk budget by the amount of accumulated risk from
this assignment.
ii. Return to step 1
(c) ELSE, remove NAI i from the unassigned NAI list created in step 3 and
return to step 4.
5. ELSE, create a new list of NAIs that request an asset of the same type as j
and have at least one asset currently assigned to them.
6. IF this assigned NAI list is not empty, select NAI, i, with the highest expected
information value for a configuration, c, that includes asset j and all previously
assigned assets to NAI i.
(a) Calculate the number of time periods, t, asset j can be assigned to NAI i in
configuration c without violating its risk budget and transition constraints.
(b) IF t > 0, assign asset j to NAI i for up to t time periods when j is available
and when its assignment will result in configuration c.
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i. Reduce asset js risk budget by the amount of accumulated risk from
this assignment.
ii. Increase asset budgets of all other assets assigned to NAI i in config-
uration c by the difference between the accumulated risk of the asset
in configuration c and the accumulated risk of the previous configu-
ration.
iii. Return to step 1
(c) ELSE, remove NAI i from the assigned NAI list created in step 5 and
return to step 6.
7. ELSE IF unable to assign any asset, exit algorithm.
8. ELSE select asset, j, with next highest remaining risk budget and return to
step 3.
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Chapter 4
Robust Approach
In this chapter we apply robust optimization to our TRAAP formulation to account
for uncertainty in our model parameters. We consider modeling uncertainty using
both polyhedral and ellipsoidal uncertainty sets.
4.1 Modeling Uncertainty Using Uncertainty Sets
Our deterministic formulation assumes that we know explicitly the values for our
expected information value, fic, and our expected risk accumulation, rjic per time
period. Clearly under real world circumstances it is impossible to estimate the exact
realized values for these parameters. It is, however, possible to accurately estimate a
range in which we expect, with high confidence, the true values for these parameters
to take. Using our information value parameter, fic, as an example we redefine our
parameters as follows, see Bertsimas and Sim [9].
f˜ic =
[
f¯ic − fˆic, f¯ic + fˆic
]
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In this notation f¯ic represents the nominal, or expected, value of the uncertain infor-
mation value parameter f˜ic. fˆic represents the half-length of the range in which we
expect the realized information value, fic, to fall in. We then expect the following to
be true for all i and c. ∣∣∣∣fic − f¯icfˆic
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1
Motivated by the central limit theorem, see Bandi and Bertsimas [3], as a means to
efficiently aggregate the uncertainty of these parameters, we propose the following
polyhedral uncertainty sets.
Ufic =
{
fic
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣fic − f¯icfˆic
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1,∀i ∈ I,∀c ∈ C, ∑
i∈I,c∈C
∣∣∣∣fic − f¯icfˆic
∣∣∣∣ ≤ Γ√D
}
Urjic =
{
rjic
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣rjic − r¯jicrˆjic
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1,∀j ∈ J, i ∈ I, c ∈ C, ∑
i∈I,c∈C
∣∣∣∣rjic − r¯jicrˆjic
∣∣∣∣ ≤ Φj√D, ∀j ∈ J
}
whereD = |I| · |C|
The new parameters Γ and Φj allow us to adjust the level of robustness we wish
to include in our model. When Γ and Φj equal zero we do not protect against
any uncertainty and our formulation is equivalent to the non-robust formulation we
outlined in Chapter 3. As we increase the values of these parameters we progressively
add robustness into our model at the expense of possibly more conservative solutions.
The ability to adjust the robustness of our model is especially useful as it allows
planners to tailor the model to the risk preferences of the commander and easily
generate multiple reconnaissance plans for consideration.
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4.2 The Robust Formulation Under Polyhedral Un-
certainty
We will now derive the robust counterpart to our deterministic TRAAP model using
polyhedral uncertainty sets. For ease of notation we define
Zic = Z
+
ic − Z−ic =
fic − f¯ic
fˆic
We can then redefine our uncertainty set for the information value parameter, fic,
as shown below.
Z =
{
Z
∣∣∣∣∣(Z+ic + Z−ic) ≤ 1,∀i ∈ I,∀c ∈ C, ∑
i∈I,c∈C
(
Z+ic + Z
−
ic
) ≤ Γ√D}
Using these robust parameters our model’s objective function now becomes:
max
x,y,w,p
∑
i∈I,c∈C,t∈T
f¯icyict +
(
min
Z
∑
i∈I,c∈C,t∈T
fˆic
(
Z+ic − Z−ic
)
yict
)
− α
∑
i∈I,c∈C,t∈T
pict
The interpretation of this new objective function is that we are trying to maximize
the expected total information value of the solution while also trying to minimize the
amount of uncertainty in our solution. As shown in Bertsimas and Sim [9] we can
restructure the inner minimization problem into an equivalent linear optimization
problem using the properties of linear optimization duality. After applying this
method we have the following robust objective function and additional constraints.
max
x,y,w,p,µ,ν,γ
∑
i∈I,c∈C,t∈T
f¯icyict + Γ
√
Dµ+
∑
i∈I,c∈C
νic −
∑
i∈I,c∈C
γic − α
∑
i∈I,c∈C,t∈T
pict
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s.t. µ+ νic + γic ≤ fˆic
∑
t∈T
yict ∀i ∈ I,∀c ∈ C
µ− νic − γic ≤ −fˆic
∑
t∈T
yict ∀i ∈ I,∀c ∈ C
µ ≤ 0
νic ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I,∀c ∈ C
γic ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I,∀c ∈ C
Applying the same process described above to our risk constraints we have the com-
plete robust TRAAP model formulation using polyhedral uncertainty sets shown
here.
max
∑
i∈I,c∈C,t∈T
f¯ic (yict − αpict) + Γ
√
Dµ+
∑
i∈I,c∈C
νic −
∑
i∈I,c∈C
γic
s.t. µ+ νic + γic ≤ fˆic
∑
t∈T
yict ∀i ∈ I,∀c ∈ C (4.1)
µ− νic − γic ≤ −fˆic
∑
t∈T
yict ∀i ∈ I,∀c ∈ C (4.2)∑
c∈C
yict ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I,∀t ∈ Ti (4.3)
yict = 0 ∀i ∈ I,∀t /∈ Ti (4.4)
xjict ≤ yict ∀j ∈ J,∀i ∈ I, (4.5)
∀t ∈ T∑
j∈Ak
xjict = akcyict ∀k ∈ K, ∀i ∈ I, (4.6)
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∀c ∈ C, ∀t ∈ T
1−
∑
c∈C
xji1ct ≥
∑
c∈C
xji2ct′ ∀j ∈ Ak, ∀k ∈ K, (4.7)
∀i1, i2 ∈ I : i1 6= i2,
∀t ∈ T : t ≤ t′ ≤ t+ eki1i2∑
i∈I,c∈C,t∈Ti
r¯jicxjict + Φj
√
Dρj +
∑
i∈I,c∈C
φjic −
∑
i∈I,c∈C
λjic ≤ mj ∀j ∈ J (4.8)
ρj + φjic + λjic ≥ rˆjic
∑
t∈Ti
xjict ∀j ∈ J,∀i ∈ I, (4.9)
∀c ∈ C
ρj − φjic − λjic ≥ −rˆjic
∑
t∈Ti
xjict ∀j ∈ J,∀i ∈ I, (4.10)
∀c ∈ C
t∑
t′=t−sk
∑
i∈I,c∈C
xjict′ ≤ sk ∀j ∈ Ak, ∀k ∈ L, (4.11)
∀t ∈ T : t > sk
β
∑
c∈C
(xjict−1 − xjict) ≤
t+β−1∑
t′=t
wit′ ∀j ∈ Ak, ∀k ∈ B, (4.12)
∀i ∈ I,∀t ∈ T : t ≥ 2
yict + wit ≤ pict + 1 ∀i ∈ I,∀c ∈ C, (4.13)
∀t ∈ T
xjict, yict, wit, pict ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ J,∀i ∈ I,∀c ∈ C,
∀t ∈ T
γic, ρj, φjic ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ J,∀i ∈ I,∀c ∈ C
µ, νic, λjic ≤ 0 ∀j ∈ J,∀i ∈ I,∀c ∈ C
53
This new model is equivalent to our non-robust, deterministic model proposed in
Section 3.2 with the exception of the new robust constraints and objective func-
tion. Constraints (4.1) and (4.2), along with the additions to the objective function,
add robustness against uncertainty in the information value parameter, fic. Con-
straints (4.8), (4.9), and (4.10) replace the risk constraints (3.6) in the deterministic
model and add robustness against uncertainty in the risk parameter, rjic. The re-
maining constraints are identical, and serve the same purpose, as those proposed in
our deterministic model.
The robust model has 2IC(J + 1) additional constraints than our non-robust
model, where I, C, and J represent the number of non-zero elements in the sets
I, C, and J respectively. The model also added complexity by the addition of six
types of new variables. Despite the addition of new constraints and variables we
have maintained the linear structure, and therefore the tractability, of our original
deterministic model. As a result this model can still be efficiently solved using readily
available commercial solvers.
4.3 The Robust Formulation Under Ellipsoidal Un-
certainty
The ability to model uncertainty in different ways is one appealing aspect of robust
optimization. Motivated by Ben-Tal and Nemirovski [4, 5] we now consider modeling
uncertainty using ellipsoidal uncertainty sets.
In this model we still expect the realized value of our uncertain parameters to
fall within some symmetrical range around a nominal value. Instead of aggregating
the uncertainty using the central limit theorem, as we did when constructing our
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polyhedral uncertainty sets, we now restrict the total “distance” that we expect the
aggregate realized values of our uncertain parameters to fall away from their nominal
values. This is accomplished using the Euclidean norm. This approach yields the
following ellipsoidal uncertainty sets.
Ufic =
{
fic
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣fic − f¯icfˆic
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1,∀i ∈ I, c ∈ C, ∑
i∈I,c∈C
(
fic − f¯ic
fˆic
)2
≤ Θ2
}
Urjic =
{
rjic
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣rjic − r¯jicrˆjic
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1,∀j ∈ J,∀i ∈ I, c ∈ C, ∑
i∈I,c∈C
(
rjic − r¯jic
rˆjic
)2
≤ Ψ2j ,∀j ∈ J
}
In this case the parameters Θ and Ψj represent the level of robustness in the model.
When these parameters are zero, just as before, the model does not protect against
any deviations in our uncertain parameters from their nominal values. As we increase
the values of Θ and Ψj we increase the level of robustness of our solution.
Using these new uncertainty sets we apply robustness to our model in the same
manner as before. This results in the following robust formulation, which is a second
order cone problem with binary variables.
max
∑
i∈I,c∈C,t∈T
f¯ic (yict − αpict)−Θ
∥∥∥∥∥fˆic∑
t∈T
yict
∥∥∥∥∥
2
s.t.
∑
c∈C
yict ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I,∀t ∈ Ti (4.14)
yict = 0 ∀i ∈ I,∀t /∈ Ti (4.15)
xjict ≤ yict ∀j ∈ J,∀i ∈ I,∀t ∈ T (4.16)
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∑
j∈Ak
xjict = akcyict ∀k ∈ K, ∀i ∈ I,∀c ∈ C, (4.17)
∀t ∈ T
1−
∑
c∈C
xji1ct ≥
∑
c∈C
xji2ct′ ∀j ∈ Ak,∀k ∈ K, (4.18)
∀i1, i2 ∈ I : i1 6= i2,
∀t ∈ T : t ≤ t′ ≤ t+ eki1i2∑
i∈I,c∈C,t∈Ti
r¯jicxjict + Ψj
∥∥∥∥∥rˆjic∑
t∈Ti
xjict
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ mj ∀j ∈ J (4.19)
t∑
t′=t−sk
∑
i∈I,c∈C
xjict′ ≤ sk ∀j ∈ Ak,∀k ∈ L, (4.20)
∀t ∈ T : t > sk
β
∑
c∈C
(xjict−1 − xjict) ≤
t+β−1∑
t′=t
wit′ ∀j ∈ Ak,∀k ∈ B, ∀i ∈ I, (4.21)
∀t ∈ T : t ≥ 2
yict + wit ≤ pict + 1 ∀i ∈ I,∀c ∈ C, ∀t ∈ T (4.22)
xjict, yict, wit, pict ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ J,∀i ∈ I,∀c ∈ C, ∀t ∈ T
Just as with our robust model using polyhedral uncertainty sets, our robust model
using ellipsoidal uncertainty sets is equivalent to our deterministic model with the
exception of the new robust constraints and objective function. This model protects
against uncertainty in the information value parameter, fic, by adding a non-linear
term to the objective function. Robustness against uncertainty in the risk parameter,
rjic, is added by replacing constraints (3.6) in the deterministic model with the
robust, non-linear constraints (4.19). The remaining constraints are identical, and
serve the same purpose, as those proposed in our deterministic model.
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Note that when using ellipsoidal uncertainty sets we do not add additional con-
straints and variables. Instead, complexity is added to our model through the non-
linearity of both our objective function and our risk constraints. However, due to
the structure of our uncertainty sets our robust model is now a second-order cone
optimization problem. Efficient solution methods for second-order cone problems
with binary variables exist and have been implemented in commercial solvers such
as CPLEX and Gurobi. Thus, tractability of our robust model is maintained.
57
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
58
Chapter 5
Fixed Allocation Approach
We now propose special cases of our deterministic and robust formulations that
prohibit assets from conducting transitions during NAI collection windows. By fixing
the allocation of assets during each collection window we reduce the complexity of
our models and achieve significant computational benefits at the expense of some
optimality and robustness. We provide these models for operational considerations.
Potentially a planner may prefer a sub-optimal plan immediately instead of a higher
quality plan later. These models give the military planner that option. Note that
unless explicitly discussed in this section all parameters from our earlier models retain
their previous definitions.
5.1 Deterministic Formulation of the Fixed Allo-
cation Approach
In order to reduce the complexity of our models outlined in Chapters 3 and 4 we
propose a few modifications and additions to their parameters. Previously we defined
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the sets I, to reflect the locations or NAIs where we wish to conduct reconnaissance,
and Ti, to describe what time periods we wish to conduct reconnaissance in NAI i.
By combining these temporal and spatial attributes we generate a new set, N , of
missions. A mission, just as before, is defined as a time window and location where
reconnaissance can be conducted. Whereas before we could define multiple collection
windows for each NAI, in this new formulation each new collection window in an NAI
is considered a distinct mission. Just as before each mission can be serviced by mul-
tiple configurations of assets. Therefore the expected information value parameter
and asset risk parameters are now defined as fnc and rjnc respectively.
We then state that if an asset is assigned to a particular mission, its allocation
is fixed and it will be considered unavailable to other missions from the mission
start time to the mission end time plus some transition time. This information is
captured in a mission compatibility matrix, gk, for each asset type. Two missions
are considered not compatible when their collection windows occur simultaneously
or when an asset cannot transition from one NAI to the other before the collection
window for the second mission begins. The values in each compatibility matrix are
represented as gkn1n2 , that is one, if mission n1 is compatible with mission n2 for assets
of type k and zero, otherwise.
By restricting asset assignments to the entire collection window of a mission,
as opposed to individual time periods in the collection window, we eliminate the
possibility of mid-collection window asset transitions and their associated penalties.
It also forces us to reassess how asset endurance limitations are modeled. It is
possible, using this formulation, to assign an asset to a mission with a collection
window longer than the asset’s endurance limit. We therefore assume that lower
level planners will decide what periods, within the mission collection window, the
asset will conduct reconnaissance and when it will return to base for maintenance and
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refueling. Despite the periodic gaps in reconnaissance by these assets the effects of
the asset on the mission, i.e., information value added, risk reduction from mixing and
redundancy, and risk accumulation, are assumed to be equally distributed throughout
the mission collection window.
Because we no longer have asset transition penalties our model has only two types
of binary decision variables. The first set of variables, ync, takes the value one, if
mission n is executed in configuration c and is zero, otherwise. The second set of
variables, xjnc, takes the value one, if asset j is assigned to mission n in configuration
c and is zero, otherwise.
Applying these changes we have the following deterministic formulation.
max
∑
n∈N,c∈C
fncync
s.t.
∑
c∈C
(xjn1c + xjn2c) ≤ 1 ∀n1 ∈ N,∀n2 ∈ N,∀j ∈ Ak, (5.1)
∀k ∈ K : gkn1n2 = 0∑
c∈C
ync ≤ 1 ∀n ∈ N (5.2)
xjnc ≤ ync ∀j ∈ J,∀n ∈ N (5.3)∑
j∈Ak
xjnc = akcync ∀k ∈ K, ∀n ∈ N, ∀c ∈ C (5.4)
∑
n∈N,c∈C
rjncxjnc ≤ mj ∀j ∈ J (5.5)
ync, xjnc ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ J,∀n ∈ N, ∀c ∈ C
Constraints (5.2), (5.3), (5.4), and (5.5) have the same functions as constraints (3.1),
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(3.3), (3.4), and (3.6) in our previous deterministic model outlined in Chapter 3.
Constraints (5.1) enforce the mission compatibility requirements, namely they ensure
that an asset cannot be assigned to two incompatible missions.
5.2 Robust Formulations of the Fixed Allocation
Approach
We now propose robust formulations of our special case model using both polyhedral
and ellipsoidal uncertainty sets. We begin by modeling uncertainty using a polyhedral
uncertainty set motivated by the central limit theorem.
Applying robustness using the same method described in Section 4.2 we have the
following formulation.
max
∑
n∈N,c∈C
f¯ncync + Γ
√
Dµ+
∑
n∈N,c∈C
νnc −
∑
n∈N,c∈C
γnc
s.t. µ+ νnc + γnc ≤ fˆncync ∀n ∈ N, ∀c ∈ C (5.6)
µ− νnc − γnc ≤ −fˆncync ∀n ∈ N, ∀c ∈ C (5.7)∑
c∈C
(xjn1c + xjn2c) ≤ 1 ∀n1 ∈ N, ∀n2 ∈ N, (5.8)
∀j ∈ Ak,
∀k ∈ K : gkn1n2 = 0∑
c∈C
ync ≤ 1 ∀n ∈ N (5.9)
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xjnc ≤ ync ∀j ∈ J,∀n ∈ N (5.10)∑
j∈Ak
xjnc = akcync ∀k ∈ K, ∀n ∈ N, (5.11)
∀c ∈ C∑
n∈N,c∈C
r¯jncxjnc + Φj
√
Dρj +
∑
n∈N,c∈C
φjnc −
∑
n∈N,c∈C
λjnc ≤ mj ∀j ∈ J (5.12)
ρj + φjnc + λjnc ≥ rˆjncxjnc ∀j ∈ J,∀n ∈ N, (5.13)
∀c ∈ C
ρj − φjnc − λjnc ≥ −rˆjncxjnc ∀j ∈ J,∀n ∈ N, (5.14)
∀c ∈ C
ync, xjnc ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ J,∀n ∈ N,∀c ∈ C
γnc, ρj, φjnc ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ J,∀n ∈ N,∀c ∈ C
µ, νnc, λjnc ≤ 0 ∀j ∈ J,∀n ∈ N,∀c ∈ C
whereD = |N | · |C|
This new model is equivalent to our deterministic model proposed in Section 5.1 with
the exception of the new robust constraints and objective function. Constraints (5.6)
and (5.7), along with the new terms in the objective function, add robustness against
uncertainty in the information value parameter, fnc. Constraints (5.12), (5.13), and
(5.14) replace the risk constraints (5.5) in the deterministic model and add robust-
ness against uncertainty in the risk parameter, rjnc. The remaining constraints are
identical, and serve the same purpose, as those proposed in our deterministic model.
The robust model has 2NC(J + 1) additional constraints than our non-robust
model, where N , C, and J represent the number of non-zero elements in the sets N ,
C, and J respectively.
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We next present a robust formulation of the Fixed Allocation model using el-
lipsoidal uncertainty sets based on the Euclidean norm. Derivation of this model
follows the same procedure outlined in Section 4.3.
max
∑
n∈N,c∈C
f¯ncync −Θ
∥∥∥fˆncync∥∥∥
2
s.t.
∑
c∈C
(xjn1c + xjn2c) ≤ 1 ∀n1 ∈ N, ∀n2 ∈ N, ∀j ∈ Ak, (5.15)
∀k ∈ K : gkn1n2 = 0∑
c∈C
ync ≤ 1 ∀n ∈ N (5.16)
xjnc ≤ ync ∀j ∈ J,∀n ∈ N (5.17)∑
j∈Ak
xjnc = akcync ∀k ∈ K, ∀n ∈ N,∀c ∈ C (5.18)
∑
n∈N,c∈C
r¯jncxjnc + Ψj ‖rˆjncxjnc‖2 ≤ mj ∀j ∈ J (5.19)
ync, xjnc ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ J,∀n ∈ N,∀c ∈ C
Just as before, our robust model using ellipsoidal uncertainty sets is equivalent to our
deterministic model with the exception of the new robust constraints and objective
function. This model protects against uncertainty in the information value parame-
ter, fnc, by adding a non-linear term to the objective function. Robustness against
uncertainty in the risk parameter, rjnc, is added by replacing constraints (5.5) in
the deterministic model with the robust, non-linear constraints (5.19). The remain-
ing constraints are identical, and serve the same purpose, as those proposed in our
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deterministic model.
By using an uncertainty set based on the Euclidean norm our robust counterpart
is a second-order cone problem, and therefore remains tractable using commercially
available solvers.
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Chapter 6
Computational Results and
Analysis
To test and evaluate our models we desire test scenarios similar to current and
anticipated operational problems facing military reconnaissance forces. Keeping this
in mind, and using the author’s first hand operational experience, we present a
representative scenario that a battalion-level reconnaissance planner may face in
a conflict similar to those in Afghanistan or Iraq. We then use this scenario to
conduct analysis of the solution quality, using simulation, of each of our models. In
particular, we focus on the effects of adding robustness into our models on solution
quality. Additionally we present further analysis on the computational demands of
our models.
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6.1 The Operational Scenario
Our test scenario is designed to reflect a typical operational problem facing battalion-
level reconnaissance planners in an environment similar to that found in Iraq or
Afghanistan during the height of US military involvement in these conflicts.
The test scenario we propose here is based on a fictional scenario used at the
National Training Center (NTC) to train US Army and Marine Corps units preparing
to conduct security and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. The NTC is
located at Ft. Irwin, CA and serves as a world class military training facility focused
on preparing units to fight in the contemporary operating environment and future
battlefields [14]. The training staff at the NTC is responsible for developing complex
and difficult training scenarios designed to tax all elements and systems in a brigade
sized unit. Using the NTC scenario as our guide we scaled the problem to a battalion
sized operation and generated representative scenario data to feed into our TRAAP
formulations and algorithms. By doing so we hope to illustrate the effectiveness of
our models on a difficult problem used in real world training.
6.1.1 Test Scenario Background
In our test scenario a battalion task force is conducting security operations in the
Gilan Province of the fictional country of Atropia. Figure 6-1 depicts a map of the
battalion’s area of operations (AO) and NAIs. Gilan Province consists of mountain-
ous terrain in the north, transitioning to rolling plains in the south. The battalion AO
has no major population centers but does contain numerous small villages connected
by a sparse, mostly unimproved road network. In total, the battalion’s assigned
section of Gilan Province has a population of around 50,000. The battalion’s area of
operations also borders the country of Donovia. Although Donovia is considered an
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ally, due to sparse and ineffective Donovian military operations near the border, the
enemy uses the mountainous Donovian borderlands as a safe haven and support zone.
Most of the battalion’s reconnaissance efforts focus on suspected enemy infiltration
routes from Donovia.
Figure 6-1: Test Scenario Area of Operations
6.1.2 Test Scenario Data
Before generating the test scenario data we established certain scenario parameters,
such as the number and type of assets, number of NAIs, number of time periods in the
planning horizon, etc., in order to appropriately scale the scenario to a battalion sized
problem. The remaining scenario data was generated randomly and then manually
modified, where necessary, to better reflect the conditions of the NTC scenario. We
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chose to create our scenario data in this manner in order to ensure some randomness
in the data while still approximating a realistic battlefield situation. In this section
we will provide an overview of the scenario metrics and discuss in more detail how
our scenario data was created.
The test scenario consists of twenty-eight possible reconnaissance missions spread
across fifteen NAI’s over a twenty-four period (hour) planning horizon. Figure 6-2
depicts the scenario asset requests and collection windows for each NAI. The NAI
asset requests in Figure 6-2 are broken down by asset type; platoon’s, UAV’s, and
scout weapons teams (SWT). The asset requests for each NAI were randomly gen-
erated and then manually adjusted to better reflect the NTC scenario’s conditions.
Asset requests were capped for each NAI at a maximum of two platoons, one UAV,
and one SWT; resulting in the number of feasible asset configurations in the scenario
being 12 (including a configuration with no assets).
Figure 6-2: Test Scenario NAI Asset Requests and Collection Windows
The NAI collection windows in the scenario are correlated to reflect times of high
expected enemy activity, implying a high demand in reconnaissance assets, and low
activity in the area. In order to generate pseudo-random collection windows and still
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ensure a period of high asset demand we randomly selected a collection window start
time for each NAI between time periods 1 and 6. This ensured that there would be
significant overlap in the collection windows for all NAIs. After establishing the first
collection window for each NAI, further collection windows were created by randomly
selecting a start time at least three time periods after the previous collection window
ended. The length for all collection windows was randomly chosen between 2 and 12
time periods.
Figure 6-2 also shows the maximum possible expected information value per time
period for conducting reconnaissance in an NAI. These values, along with the infor-
mation values for other asset configurations, were generated using the number and
type of assets in each configuration and a randomly assigned NAI priority. All NAIs
were first randomly ranked from highest to lowest priority, where high priority in
this context means that, based on the scenario, we would expect a relatively higher
information value for reconnaissance conducted in the NAI. A few manual adjust-
ments to the priorities were then made to ensure consistency with the NTC scenario.
Nominal information values, f¯ic, were then assigned to each NAI/configuration pair
based on the NAI’s priority and the number and type of assets in the configuration.
The number and type of assets requested in each NAI was used to develop this data
due to the assumption that NAIs with larger asset requests will typically return
more valuable information. In reality this is not always the case, and we use the NAI
priority parameter to reflect this characteristic of real world scenarios. By doing so,
we ensured that some NAIs with relatively few assets requested would have higher
expected information values than other NAIs with more assets requested. The values
for the f¯nc parameters were calculated by summing the values of f¯ic for the number
of time periods in mission n.
Figure 6-2 also provides a general description (High, Medium, and Low) of the
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level of risk when conducting reconnaissance in each NAI. Risk data was generated by
randomly assigning each NAI an overall risk value between 0.0 and 1.0. Again, a small
number of manual adjustments were made to these assignments to ensure scenario
consistency. We categorized each NAI in Figure 6-2 based on these assignment. For
example, a high risk NAI has an overall risk value in the interval 0.667 to 1.0 and
a low risk NAI has an overall risk value in the interval 0.0 to .333. Risk values for
each asset type were then derived using this overall NAI risk value and the number
and type of assets in each configuration. Asset risk values were assigned so that the
level of risk exposure per time period is decreased for each additional asset in the
configuration.
We used two methods to establish the amount of uncertainty in our uncertain
parameters, f¯ic and r¯jic. In the scenario we assumed that all parameter uncertainty
was normally distributed around the nominal values. We also felt, based on the NTC
scenario information on hand, that the reconnaissance planners had a better estimate
of the amount of uncertainty in the information value parameters compared to the
risk value parameters. Thus, we randomly assigned each NAI a level of information
value uncertainty, fˆic, between 10% and 90% of the nominal information value for
each configuration. The varied levels of uncertainty reflects the battalion’s belief
that they having a reasonable idea of the level of information value uncertainty in
each NAI. In contrast, the level of uncertainty for the risk parameters, rˆjic, was
set equal to 50% of the nominal risk value for all NAIs and configurations. This
implies that the battalion planners do not have a good estimate of which NAIs
have more or less risk uncertainty relative to the risk parameter nominal values.
The values for the parameters fˆic and fˆic represent two standard deviations of the
normally distributed uncertain parameters. This ensures, under the assumption that
the parameters accurately represent the real world, that the realized values of the
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uncertain parameters will fall with high probability, roughly 95%, within the interval
[f¯ic − fˆic, f¯ic + fˆic].
In the scenario the planner has approximately one third (four platoons) of the
battalion’s ground forces available to devote to reconnaissance tasks. This assumes
that the remaining battalion forces are devoted to other vital missions such as force
protection, offensive operations, civil-affairs, etc. The battalion is being supported
by two RQ-7B Shadow UAV’s and a dedicated scout weapons team (SWT) of OH-
58D Kiowa helicopters. Transition times between NAIs vary by asset type between
one and four time periods and only platoons are subject to transition penalties in
this scenario. The Shadow UAVs are subject to a nine hour endurance constraint
while the SWT has an endurance limit of two hours. Furthermore, the commander
has set the asset type risk budgets, meaning the amount of risk each type of asset
can assume, to protect platoons the most, followed by the SWT and then UAVs. All
of these parameters were selected manually to best reflect the conditions in the NTC
scenario. Table 6.1 provides a summary of these scenario metrics.
Table 6.1: Test Scenario Asset Summary
Asset Type Quantity
Trans.
Times
(Per)
Trans.
Penalties
Endurance
Limit
(Per)
Risk
Budget
Platoon 4 1 to 4 Yes None Low
UAV 2 1 No 9 High
SWT 1 1 No 2 Medium
6.2 Model Simulation
In order to evaluate the solutions produced by our TRAAP formulation and al-
gorithms it was necessary to use simulation. There are numerous approaches to
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simulation testing and, ideally, one would use a closed-loop method. A closed-loop
simulation for our scenario would generate realized information value and risk data
for each time period, starting at the beginning of our planning time horizon. The
simulation would implement each TRAAP solution time period by time period un-
til an asset violates its risk budget. At that time the simulation would input the
remaining risk levels of all assets, and other pertinent data, back into our TRAAP
formulation and generate a new solution for the remainder of the planning time hori-
zon. The simulation would resume and progress in this manner until all assets have
violated their risk budgets or the simulation reaches the end of the planning time
horizon. A closed-loop simulation such as this is very computationally expensive and
difficult to implement.
We selected to use a different, less complicated, form of simulation known as
Monte Carlo simulation. In a Monte Carlo simulation realized values for all of our
unknown data are generated. We then apply our solutions using this realized data.
After applying the data we can determine if an asset or assets have violated their
risk budgets and calculate the total realized information value of the solution. By
repeating this process multiple times we can generate statistics on how each solution
performs and use this information to compare solutions against one another.
In our testing we generated 5,000 separate realizations of our unknown risk and
information value parameters. All of our solutions were tested using this set of data
realizations in order to fairly evaluate their performance against one another. In
each simulation the unknown risk and information value parameters for each time
period were sampled from a normal distribution with a mean equal to f¯ic and r¯jic
and standard deviation equal to fˆic
2
and
rˆjic
2
. If a time period was subject to an asset
transition penalty the simulation randomly determined whether the asset transition
was observed or not. We assumed that all asset transitions had an 80% chance of
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being observed by the enemy. If the asset transition was observed the corresponding
realized information values were sampled from a distribution with mean equal to f¯ic
4
and standard deviation equal to fˆic
4
. If the asset transition was not observed by the
enemy the realized information value was sampled from the original distribution. To
avoid negative information and risk values, if the realized parameter value was less
than zero it was reset to equal zero. The parameters fˆnc and rˆjnc were calculated by
summing the realized parameter values for the time periods and NAI corresponding
to mission n.
6.3 Model Performance and Comparison
After simulation we compared our model solutions using three primary performance
measures; the mean of the realized information value collected over all simulations,
the standard deviation of the collected information value over all simulations, and
model feasibility. Model feasibility is a measure of constraint violation frequency. A
model was deemed feasible for a simulated scenario only if no assets exceeded their
maximum risk allowance. These three performance measures dictate the solution
quality of the model solution.
We selected these performance measures because they directly translate to char-
acteristics of desirable reconnaissance plans. The mean realized information value
is the expected intelligence benefit received from executing the plan. Clearly max-
imizing this value is the primary goal of any reconnaissance plan. The standard
deviation of the collected information value is a measure of how certain the plan is
of achieving the expected outcome. By minimizing this value it is less likely that
our reconnaissance assets will return to base without useful information. The fi-
nal performance measure, model feasibility, directly translates into saving soldiers’
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lives. A risk constraint violation implies that a unit is exposed to an unacceptable
level of risk. Solutions that minimize the likelihood of constraint violation reduce
the chances of soldiers being injured. Therefore a model solution with high solution
quality will have a large mean realized information value, small standard deviation,
and high probability of model feasibility.
6.3.1 Human Approximation Algorithm and Deterministic
Model Performance
Table 6.2 displays the solution performance of the deterministic and human approx-
imation algorithms after five thousand simulated realizations of the test scenario.
Table 6.2: Human Approximation Algorithm and Deterministic Model Solution
Performance
Model Mean Std Dev % Feasible
High Priority Algorithm 28.5 0.989 60.2%
NAI Coverage Algorithm 22.3 0.476 1.8%
Deterministic Model 38.3 0.800 27.1%
In total, our optimization based deterministic model outperformed both human
planning approximation algorithms. The High Priority and NAI Coverage algorithm
solutions each bested the deterministic model solution in a single performance cat-
egory; the High Priority solution improved solution feasibility by over 33% and the
NAI Coverage solution reduced the standard deviation of the total information value
by over 40% from the deterministic model. However, these performance gains came
at a very steep cost to mean information value collected, 26% for the High Prior-
ity algorithm and 42% for the NAI Coverage algorithm. In addition to the cost in
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mean information value both algorithm solutions performed worse than the deter-
ministic model solution in the other performance categories. Based on this evidence,
particularly the prohibitively high cost in mean information value, we can conclude
that our deterministic model provides an improvement in reconnaissance planning
performance from typical human planning methods.
Further analysis of our solutions provides some insight into why our human ap-
proximation algorithms performed poorly compared to our deterministic model. Fig-
ures 6-3, 6-4, and 6-5 provide an overview of the solutions derived using our deter-
ministic model, High Priority algorithm, and NAI Coverage algorithm, respectively.
The green sections represent the time periods when reconnaissance is conducted in
an NAI. The labels on, or adjacent to, the green sections state the number of pla-
toons, UAVs, and SWTs assigned to conduct reconnaissance in the NAI during that
time interval.
Figure 6-3: Test Scenario Deterministic Model Solution
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Figure 6-4: Test Scenario High Priority Algorithm Solution
After studying these results we conclude that the High Priority algorithm per-
forms poorly due to its failure to fully account for the level of risk of conducting
reconnaissance in each NAI. The algorithm selects locations to conduct reconnais-
sance solely on the expected information value returned. It only accounts for the
risk level of an NAI when determining how many time periods it can assign assets
to conduct reconnaissance in it. By using risk in a secondary manner such as this it
leaves the algorithm susceptible to assigning assets to a relatively high risk mission
where the expected information value return may not necessarily be worth the risk
invested. This appears to be the case in our test scenario. In Figure 6-4 we see
that the algorithm chose to maximize reconnaissance in NAI 04. This intuitively
makes sense as NAI 04 provides the highest expected information value return per
time period. However, NAI 04 is a medium risk NAI and therefore conducting re-
connaissance in NAI 04 comes with a significant risk investment, even with the risk
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reducing effects of mixing and redundancy. As a result over half of our available
assets (2 PLT’s, 1 UAV, and 1 SWT) devote a substantial part of their risk budgets
to conducting reconnaissance in NAI 04. This limits the availability of these assets
for additional missions and reduces the overall information value of the solution.
The deterministic model avoids this problem. By design the model weighs the
costs and benefits of conducting reconnaissance in each NAI. Thus, the deterministic
model tends to select reconnaissance missions with the most efficient reward to risk
ratio. For example, in Figure 6-3 we see that the deterministic model prioritized
platoon reconnaissance in NAI 08 and NAI 12. Both of these NAIs are low risk and
have high, although not the highest, expected information value per time period.
This high information value to risk ratio makes these NAIs an efficient use of our
low risk budget assets.
Being efficient in allocating assets does not mean that our deterministic model
ignores high or medium risk NAIs. In fact, the deterministic model assigns assets
to nearly all high and medium risk NAIs for at least a portion of their requested
collection windows. However, when doing so, the model generally assigns assets with
higher risk budgets, UAVs and SWTs, to these high and medium risk NAIs. By com-
pletely considering the cost/benefit trade-offs of asset assignments the deterministic
model is able to maximize the expected information value of the solution.
The High Priority algorithm’s higher solution standard deviation compared to
the deterministic model is also likely due to the algorithm’s emphasis on executing
missions with the highest expected information value. In general, NAI’s with higher
expected information value tended to have more uncertainty in the information value
parameter. This reflects the idea that if we highly value a certain piece of information,
it is likely that our enemy will go to greater lengths to deny us this information. The
enemy’s counter-reconnaissance efforts in high priority NAIs present an additional
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variable that leads to greater uncertainty in the quality of information we obtain.
Because the High Priority algorithm stresses execution of missions with high expected
information value we would expect that the variability of our realized information
value would also be greater.
Figure 6-5: Test Scenario NAI Coverage Algorithm Solution
When considering the NAI Coverage algorithm we conclude that its performance
suffers, primarily, due to its failure to exploit the benefits of mixing and redundancy.
Figure 6-5 depicts the solution derived using the NAI Coverage algorithm. As the
name suggests, we would expect that the NAI Coverage algorithm would assign assets
to all, or nearly all, NAIs for at least a portion of their collection windows. In fact, the
solution produced by this algorithm provides less total NAI coverage than both the
deterministic model and High Priority solutions. This is a result of the algorithm’s
emphasis on minimizing the number of assets assigned to conduct reconnaissance in
each NAI, in other words, its avoidance of asset mixing and redundancy. Mixing
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and redundancy provide risk reducing benefits, many units working in coordination
are all generally exposed to less risk, but come at a cost of devoting a large portion
of the available assets to a single NAI, as was seen in our High Priority model. In
the case of our test scenario, by avoiding the benefits of mixing and redundancy our
assets, especially the low risk budget assets, accumulated risk at a much higher rate
than in our other approaches. This resulted in an overall reduction in NAI coverage
and a steep loss of mean information value collected.
The deterministic model addresses this issue by selectively using mixing and
redundancy to minimize the risk accumulation of the low risk budget assets. In
Figure 6-3 we see that in nearly all platoon assignments the platoon is supported
by at least one other asset. The only instance where this does not occur is in NAI
14, where only a single platoon is requested. This strategy of supporting low risk
budget assets also reduces the risk exposure to the supporting assets, allowing them
to conduct further reconnaissance in other NAIs. By inherently protecting low risk
budget assets the deterministic model avoids the performance obstacles observed in
the NAI Coverage algorithm and maintains a significantly higher mean information
value.
6.3.2 Robust Model Performance
Table 6.3 outlines the performance of solutions to the robust model using ellipsoidal
uncertainty sets after five thousand simulated realizations of the test scenario. This
table displays results when robustness is added to both the information value (Θ)
and risk constraint (Ψ) parameters. For comparison we also include the solution per-
formance of our deterministic model and human planning approximation algorithms.
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Table 6.3: Robust Model Solution Performance
Model Mean Std Dev % Feasible Θ Ψ
High Priority Algorithm 28.5 0.989 60.2% N/A N/A
NAI Coverage Algorithm 22.3 0.476 1.8% N/A N/A
Deterministic 38.3 0.800 27.1% N/A N/A
Robust Model -
Ellipsoidal Uncertainty
37.9 0.782 38.0% 0.1 0.1
37.8 0.782 61.2% 0.2 0.2
37.5 0.772 89.2% 0.4 0.4
37.3 0.771 97.8% 0.6 0.6
37.0 0.767 100.0% 1.0 1.0
34.9 0.741 100.0% 2.0 2.0
The simulation results show that the robust model formulation consistently pro-
duces higher quality solutions, in terms of solution feasibility and standard deviation,
for a relatively minor cost to expected information value collected when compared
to the deterministic model. For example at robustness level of Θ/Ψ = 1.0 we can
achieve a 4% reduction in solution standard deviation for a cost in mean total infor-
mation value of around 3% from the deterministic model. We also improve solution
feasibility by a dramatic 73% when applying robustness at this level. Although gains
in solution variability are modest in this case the most significant improvements in
solution performance occur in, arguably, the most important performance measure,
solution feasibility.
Our robust model also decisively outperforms both of our human planning ap-
proximation algorithms. For example, the robust model can achieve similar solution
feasibility performance to the High Priority model (around 60%) but at a fraction
of the cost in expected information value while also still maintaining a significantly
lower standard deviation. Although, in the cases we tested, we were unable to match
the NAI Coverage solution’s standard deviation using our robust models, it is unlikely
that an operational commander would be willing to give up over 42% of his expected
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information value and assume a significant risk of reconnaissance plan infeasibility
to achieve these improvements; especially when one considers that solution standard
deviation is a less significant, in an operational context, performance measure.
These results show that by using our robust model during planning a comman-
der will considerably improve his reconnaissance plan solution quality compared to
typical human generated plans. Additionally, our results imply that by using our
robust models a commander can trade a small reduction in expected intelligence
information to dramatically reduce the risk exposure of his soldiers compared to our
deterministic model.
6.3.3 Ellipsoidal vs. Polyhedral Uncertainty
It is evident that our robust model using ellipsoidal uncertainty sets provides im-
proved solutions over our deterministic model. We now compare the solution per-
formance of our robust model using ellipsoidal uncertainty sets with the solution
performance of our robust model using polyhedral uncertainty sets. Figures 6-6, 6-7,
and 6-8 depict the performance measures of both robust models as a function of the
relative cost of robustness, in terms of average percent total information value loss,
compared to the non-robust model. All figures depict solution performance when
robustness is added to both the information value and risk parameters.
Figure 6-6 depicts the solution feasibility performance of both robust models.
In our scenario the model using ellipsoidal uncertainty sets strictly outperforms the
model using polyhedral uncertainty sets in this measure. For instance, the ellipsoidal
uncertainty model achieves near 100% solution feasibility (greater than 97.5%) at
the cost of around 2.7% in expected total information value while the polyhedral
uncertainty model achieves this mark at the cost of nearly 3.6% in expected total
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Figure 6-6: Robust Model Solution Feasibility
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information value. The ellipsoidal uncertainty model outperforms the polyhedral
uncertainty model in this manner at all levels of solution feasibility performance.
Figure 6-7 and Figure 6-8 show the solution standard deviation as a function
of expected total information value lost from the non-robust model. We can see
that both models reduce solution standard deviation as robustness is added into
the model. The trend, depicted by a linear trend line, for both models clearly
shows that there is a reduction in solution standard deviation at higher levels of
robustness, but predicting how much decrease one will see from one solution to the
next is difficult. Regardless, by adding robustness into the model, solution quality
in terms of variability will remain similar or improved. The bottom line is that
robustness will not hurt solution variability. The inconsistency in solution variability
improvement of both models makes it impossible to decisively state which model
outperforms the other in this performance measure. Despite this we can state that,
in general, both models have an increased mission success rate, meaning a higher
rate of reconnaissance assets returning from a mission with useful information, as
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Figure 6-7: Robust Solution Std. Deviation - Ellipsoidal Uncertainty
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robustness is added into the model.
Based on this analysis we conclude that our model using ellipsoidal uncertainty
sets outperforms our model using polyhedral uncertainty sets in terms of solution
quality. The solutions produced by the model using ellipsoidal uncertainty sets con-
sistently achieve higher feasibility rates with less cost than the solutions produced
by the model using polyhedral uncertainty sets. Both models also reduced solution
variability as robustness was added into the model, but in an inconsistent manner. In
operational terms these results suggest that reconnaissance plans developed by our
model using ellipsoidal uncertainty sets will have greater risk reductions to assets
and more consistently successful missions than plans generated by our robust model
using polyhedral uncertainty sets, our deterministic model, or human planners.
6.3.4 Solution Quality Under Varying Levels of Uncertainty
When developing our models we made certain assumptions about the amount of
uncertainty in the risk and information value parameters. We chose values for the
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Figure 6-8: Robust Solution Std. Deviation - Polyhedral Uncertainty
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fˆict, fˆnc, rˆjic, and rˆjnc parameters that we felt represented the half-length of the range
in which we expected, with high confidence, that the true values of these parameters
would take. Specifically, the fˆict, fˆnc, rˆjic, and rˆjnc parameters encompass a range
that is two standard deviations from the nominal value. Meaning, if we assume a
normal distribution for each parameter, we estimate that roughly 95% of the time
the true, realized value of our parameters would fall within our chosen intervals. In
our simulations we assumed that the values we chose for these parameters were a
reasonable representation of reality. However, in a real world operational situation
it is possible that these assumptions are inaccurate. For this reason we now present
an analysis on the stability of our robust and non-robust solutions as simulated
parameter uncertainty is varied.
In this test we first solved our models under a certain assumption of the level of
uncertainty in the parameters, we term this “ideal” uncertainty. We then varied the
value of uncertainty in our simulation to understand how solution performance was
effected. In order to compare our robust model based on polyhedral uncertainty sets
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and our robust model using ellipsoidal uncertainty sets we tested solutions from each
model that had similar performance in simulation, in terms of mean total information
value, information value standard deviation, and solution feasibility, under “ideal”
uncertainty; meaning the realizations of our uncertain parameters were likely to fall in
the range we predicted. We also include the solution performance of our High Priority
algorithm, deterministic model, and of our model using ellipsoidal uncertainty sets at
robustness level of Θ/Ψ = 1.0 that was highlighted in Section 6.3.2 for comparison.
The solution performance for these points under “ideal” conditions are depicted in
Table 6.4.
Table 6.4: Performance of Comparable Solutions of Both Robust Models Under “Ideal”
Uncertainty
Model Mean Std. Dev. % Feasible Γ/Θ Φ/Ψ
Deterministic 38.3 0.800 27.1% N/A N/A
High Priority 28.5 0.989 60.2% N/A N/A
Robust - Ellip. 37.0 0.767 100.0% 1.0 1.0
Robust - Ellip. 37.9 0.782 38.0% 0.1 0.1
Robust - Poly. 37.6 0.810 36.0% 0.06 0.06
Robust - Ellip. 37.8 0.782 61.2% 0.2 0.2
Robust - Poly. 37.4 0.804 58.1% 0.09 0.09
Figure 6-9 shows the feasibility performance for each of the solutions in Table 6.4
as the level of uncertainty in our parameters is varied during simulation. The x-axis
in Figure 6-9 represents the multiplicative factor used in simulation of the uncertain
parameter standard deviation we assumed when generating our solutions. There-
fore 1 depicts solution performance when the level of uncertainty in our parameters
during simulation is “ideal”, meaning it equals what we assumed when developing
our solutions. The value 2, for example, represents a parameter distribution in sim-
ulation with twice the standard deviation than we assumed, and values less than 1
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represent less uncertainty in simulation than we originally assumed.
Figure 6-9: Solution Feasibility Under Varying Levels of Uncertainty
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Figure 6-9 clearly shows that our robust solutions provide higher quality solutions
than our deterministic model when underestimating the level of uncertainty in our
parameters. The results for robustness level of Θ/Ψ = 1.0 are particularly encour-
aging. For a cost of around 3% in mean information value we can underestimate the
uncertainty of our parameters by a factor of three and still achieve a greater than
50% feasibility rate. Our non-robust model does not achieve this level of feasibility
even when we know the exact amount of uncertainty in our parameters. When we
compare the stability of our two robust model solutions we see that in both cases we
tested, the solution derived using ellipsoidal uncertainty maintained a higher level
of performance as parameter uncertainty was increased than its counterpart derived
using polyhedral uncertainty. Similar, although less striking, performance is seen in
solution variability as uncertainty is increased in our simulation.
Also of interest is the performance of the High Priority algorithm solution com-
pared to our deterministic and robust solution performance. The High Priority
88
solution performs slightly better in this metric when compared to our deterministic
solution and robust solutions with similar feasibility rates under “ideal” conditions
(Ellip.-0.2 and Poly.0.09). However, just as before, when we consider the cost in ex-
pected information value to achieve this slight performance advantage we still must
conclude that our deterministic and robust models provide higher quality solutions
overall. Furthermore, our robust solution with robustness level of Θ/Ψ = 1.0 pro-
vides significantly better solution stability than the High Priority algorithm solution
at dramatically less cost in information value. This example implies that solutions
derived from our models will nearly always outperform human generated solutions.
Overall, these results mean that by using our robust models to develop recon-
naissance plans military planners can ensure better mission results compared to non-
robust and typical human planning methods, even if they seriously misjudge their
knowledge of the enemy and the battlefield.
6.3.5 Solution Time Performance
One of the appealing attributes of the robust optimization techniques used in this
paper is that they preserve the tractability of our model. This is important as
reconnaissance planning is generally conducted in a time constrained environment.
If our robust models cannot be solved in a reasonable amount of time they will not
be useful in application despite their significant improvement in solution quality.
Therefore a comparison of the computational demands of our models is necessary.
Figure 6-10 displays a comparison of solution times for our deterministic and
robust models. The data points used for comparison in Section 6.3.4 are used in
Figure 6-10 to show the differences in solution progress over time, in seconds, be-
tween solutions from our model using ellipsoidal uncertainty sets and from our model
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using polyhedral uncertainty sets with similar performance. The results depicted in
Figure 6-10 were derived by solving our models using Gurobi 5.0.2 on a computer
with 8xIntel Core i7-860(2.8GHz) processors and 16GB of memory.
Figure 6-10: Solution Time Comparison
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Understandably the deterministic model solves considerably faster than the more
complex robust models, especially when solving to proof of optimality. However,
when one considers the 3% relative optimality gap solution times we see that the
robust models do produce high quality solutions in a reasonable amount of time. In
fact, in all cases we tested the solver reached solutions within 5% of optimality in
under 300 seconds and in most instances, our robust models reached solutions within
3% of optimality in under 300 seconds. Even better performance, with respect to
finding the optimal solution, was achieved when the solver was set to prioritize
finding feasible solutions over proving optimality. Between the two robust models
the polyhedral model generally reached the optimal solution and proved optimality
faster than the ellipsoidal model. However, this advantage was too inconsistent
between tests, as can be seen by the robustness level Θ/Ψ = 1.0 results, to provide a
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definitive explanation of the extent of the polyhedral model’s dominance in this area.
Despite this, our results show that both the polyhedral or ellipsoidal robust models
can generate high quality solutions in a time constrained, operational environment.
We can reduce solution times further by using our fixed allocation model. Ta-
ble 6.5 illustrates the trade-offs of using the robust fixed allocation model as opposed
to our standard robust models. The table shows a selection of robust fixed allocation
and robust model solutions that have similar performance in solution variability and
feasibility. The column “Solution Time” in the table depicts the time, in seconds,
for the solver to prove optimality of the solution. The columns “5% Time” and “3%
Time” refer to the seconds required for the solver to achieve a 5% and 3% relative
optimality gap, respectively.
Table 6.5: Fixed Allocation Model Solution Time Comparison
Model Mean
Std.
Dev.
% Feasible
5%
Time
3%
Time
Solution
Time
FA Deterministic 34.1 0.762 64.5% 0.2 0.2 0.2
FA Robust - Ellip. 34.1 0.762 91.4% 2 2 2.8
FA Robust - Poly. 34.1 0.762 91.4% 0.2 0.2 0.2
Robust - Ellip. 37.5 0.786 90.4% 101 431 4536
Robust - Poly. 36.9 0.808 88.9% 29 356 2712
In this case both of the robust fixed allocation models reached identical solutions
in under three seconds. It is worthwhile to note that solution times to optimality
remained under eight seconds for all fixed allocation models tested. The standard
robust models took around 45 minutes and over an hour to prove optimality of solu-
tions with similar standard deviations and feasibility to the robust fixed allocation
solutions. This impressive reduction in solution time to optimality comes at a cost of
expected information collected, as can be seen by the lower mean total information
values of the fixed allocation models.
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These results do not discount the usefulness of our standard robust models. As
can be seen in Figure 6-10 and Table 6.5 high quality solutions (within 5% of opti-
mality) can be achieved within a few minutes using our standard models. We propose
both our standard and fixed allocation models in order to provide military planners
more flexibility when conducting operations. In an environment where higher qual-
ity solutions are more important than producing an immediate plan, a planner can
chose to use our standard robust models. If the planner is subject to severe time con-
straints and optimality is less important, he can still generate multiple high quality
plans for consideration using our fixed allocation robust models.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
We have shown that robust optimization using the techniques described in Bertsi-
mas and Sim [9] provides an effective, flexible, and tractable method to model the
TRAAP with uncertainty. Most importantly we have demonstrated the ability of
our robust models to reduce the risk exposure of soldiers at a minimal cost to ex-
pected information value. Although this research is only a small contribution in the
area of reconnaissance planning, we feel that it presents a solid case for using robust
optimization in future work in this area.
7.1 Summary of Results and Contributions
An overview of our contributions and findings is outlined below.
 We propose a deterministic integer optimization formulation of the Tactical
Reconnaissance Asset Allocation Problem (TRAAP). The inputs to the de-
terministic model can be derived from the outputs of the Military Decision
Making Process (MDMP) allowing simpler implementation into the current
93
Army planning methodology.
 We introduce two algorithms that produce reconnaissance plans representative
of a typical plan developed by a human planner under time constraints. The
algorithms model the two typical approaches of reconnaissance planners. The
first algorithm attempts to focus as many assets as possible on collecting on
the NAIs with highest expected information value per time period. The second
algorithm seeks to conduct reconnaissance in as many NAIs as possible by
minimizing the total number of assets assigned to collect in an NAI.
 We propose two robust extensions to our deterministic model. The first ex-
tension models uncertainty using a polyhedral uncertainty set motivated by
the central-limit theorem. The second extension models uncertainty using an
ellipsoidal uncertainty set based on the Euclidean Norm. The resulting ro-
bust formulations are mixed integer linear and second order cone problems,
respectively.
 We propose special cases of our deterministic and robust formulations that
prohibit assets from conducting transitions during NAI collection windows.
We then show that our Fixed Allocation models drastically improve solution
times while still producing quality solutions.
 We show that both solutions derived using our deterministic and robust models
significantly outperform solutions generated using our human planner approx-
imation algorithms. The human approximation algorithms provide marginal
improvement in certain performance measures, but at a prohibitively larger
cost in expected information value collected.
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 We show that our robust models consistently produce higher quality solutions
than our deterministic model. Our results imply that by using our robust
models a commander can trade a small reduction in expected intelligence in-
formation to dramatically reduce the risk exposure of his soldiers compared
to our deterministic and human approximation models. This is true even if
planners seriously underestimate the level of uncertainty of their parameters.
 We show that our robust model using ellipsoidal uncertainty outperforms our
model using polyhedral uncertainty in terms of solution quality. However, this
improved performance comes at a cost of generally longer solution times.
7.2 Future Work
Here we present some recommendations for future work in the area of robust recon-
naissance planning.
 Validate models using data from training centers such as the NTC or from
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US military has developed and exe-
cuted innumerable reconnaissance plans in both combat situations and train-
ing. In many circumstances, especially at training centers such as the NTC,
the military has kept detailed records of the effectiveness of these plans after
implementation. This information could help validate our models by confirm-
ing assumptions and highlighting areas for model improvement. In this thesis
our testing was based on a scenario using contrived data. Although we took
measures to make this scenario as realistic as possible, only data from real
world military operations can truly confirm the utility of our models.
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 Develop methods to more accurately quantify uncertain parameters. A signifi-
cant hurdle to implementing our robust models is the difficulty in estimating
values for our uncertain parameters. Although we showed that our models still
provide quality solutions even if we drastically misjudge our uncertain parame-
ters, solution quality in this case still suffers. Further research using operational
data from Iraq and Afghanistan could be done on developing formulas to better
guide planners on estimating uncertain parameters in our models.
 Extend testing to different types of operational scenarios. Our testing was
completed using an operational scenario representing a battalion level security
and counterinsurgency operation in an area similar to Afghanistan. Further
testing could be done on model performance when using scenarios with varying
conditions. For example, how does increased asset transition times in a very
large area of operations effect solution quality? Other scenario factors such as
number of NAIs, number and type of assets, and length of planning horizon,
among others, could all be varied to examine their impact on overall solution
performance.
 Evaluate solution quality when adding and changing scenario uncertainty. In
our scenario we made certain assumptions regarding the type of uncertainty
in our models and scenario. Within the scenario, for example, we assumed
that all uncertain parameters were normally distributed. Further testing using
other symmetric distributions would show the versatility of our robust models.
Additionally, we only assumed uncertainty in our information value and risk
parameters. Extensions to our robust models incorporating uncertainty in
asset availability, weather effects, and unit transition times could enhance the
applicability and usefulness of our models.
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 Compare our robust TRAAP models to TRAAP models developed using dif-
ferent robust optimization approaches. In this thesis we only considered the
Bertsimas and Sim approach to robust optimization. This is not the only
method to account for uncertainty and a comparison with other approaches,
such as those discussed in Section 2.3, could illustrate certain conditions when
other methods provide higher quality solutions.
 Apply a heuristic approach to developing solutions to the TRAAP. Although
heuristics do not account for uncertainty, it still may be possible to develop
a heuristic that generates high quality reconnaissance plans with some robust
characteristics. A heuristic approach could significantly improve solution time
and avoid the use of an optimization solver, making operational implementation
much easier.
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Appendix A
Abbreviations and Acronyms
Abbreviation/
Acronym
Term
AO Area of Operations
CCIR Commander’s Critical Information Requirements
CDR Commander
COA Course of Action
GB Gigabyte
GHz Gigahertz
HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
LP Linear Program/Linear Programming
MDMP Military Decision Making Process
MILP Mixed Integer Linear Program
MMS Mast Mounted Sight
NAI Named Area of Interest
NTC National Training Center
Per Time Periods
PLT Platoon
PIR Priority Intelligence Requirements
SOCP Second Order Cone Problem
SWT Scout Weapons Team
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Abbreviation/
Acronym
Term
TRAAP Tactical Reconnaissance Asset Allocation Problem
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
US United States
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Appendix B
Sets, Parameters, and Variables
Type Symbol Description Unit Min Max
Sets
J set of all assets - - -
K set of all asset types - - -
B ⊂ K set of asset types subject to
asset transition penalties
- - -
L ⊂ K set of asset types subject to
endurance limits
- - -
Ak ⊂ J set of assets of type k - - -
I set of all NAIs - - -
C set of all asset configurations - - -
T set of discrete time intervals - - -
Ti ⊂ T set of time intervals when
missions in NAI i can be ex-
ecuted
- - -
N set of all missions - - -
Parameters
akic quantity of asset type k in
NAI i configuration c
Units 0 2
f¯ic point forecast of the infor-
mation value per time pe-
riod when executing mission
in NAI i in configuration c
- 0.0 ∞
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous page
Type Symbol Description Unit Min Max
Parameters
fˆic half-length of the informa-
tion value range forecast
centered at f¯ic
- 0.0 ∞
mj risk budget for asset j - 0.0 ∞
r¯jic point forecast of the accu-
mulated risk per time pe-
riod of asset j when execut-
ing mission in NAI i in con-
figuration c
- 0.0 ∞
rˆjic half-length of the accumu-
lated risk range forecast cen-
tered at r¯jic
- 0.0 ∞
eki1i2 time periods required for as-
sets of type k to transition
from NAI i1 to NAI i2
Hours 1 4
sk maximum consecutive time
periods assets of type k can
conduct reconnaissance
Hours 2 9
α information value asset tran-
sition penalty constant
- 0.0 1.0
β time periods asset transition
penalty is in effect following
an asset transition
Hours 0 4
Γ budget of uncertainty for in-
formation value (Polyhedral
Uncertainty)
- 0.0 ∞
Φj budget of uncertainty for
risk for asset j (Polyhedral
Uncertainty)
- 0.0 ∞
Θ budget of uncertainty for in-
formation value (Ellipsoidal
Uncertainty)
- 0.0 ∞
Ψj budget of uncertainty for
risk for asset j (Ellipsoidal
Uncertainty)
- 0.0 ∞
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous page
Type Symbol Description Unit Min Max
Variables
xjict Binary: asset j assigned to
mission in NAI i in configu-
ration c at time t
- 0 1
yict Binary: mission in NAI i ex-
ecuted in configuration c at
time t
- 0 1
wit Binary: a mission in NAI i
is subject to an asset transi-
tion penalty during time t if
executed
- 0 1
pict Binary: mission in NAI i ex-
ecuted in configuration c is
subject to an asset transi-
tion penalty during time t
- 0 1
ρj dual variable (information
value)
- 0 ∞
φjic dual variable (information
value)
- 0 ∞
λjic dual variable (information
value)
- −∞ 0
µ dual variable (risk) - −∞ 0
νic dual variable (risk) - −∞ 0
γic dual variable (risk) - 0 ∞
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